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This paper uses a formal model of search over multiattribute alter­
natives, analyzed in a product market setting, to investigate the 
theoretical foundations of the empirical literature on duration of 
search and turnover in product markets, labor markets, and mar­
riage markets. A number of specific empirical predictions are also 
derived. In particular, whether "quality" is a "search" attribute or an 
"experience" attribute is related to the cost of search, the cost of 
·inspection, the price of the good, and certain properties of the 
market distribution of price and quality. 
I. Introduction 
Several years ago Phillip Nelson observed that certain problems arise 
in extending search theory to deal with nonhomogeneous goods. In 
particular, he noted that "information about quality differs from 
information about price because the former is usually more expensive 
to buy than the latter" ( 1970, p. 3 1 1). To analyze the implications of 
this observation, Nelson divided goods into two classes, search goods 
and experience goods. Search goods are those for which utility is 
assessed before purchase by actual inspection. Experience goods are 
those for which utility is assessed after purchase by actual consump­
tion. 
This paper is a substantially revised version of "Further Results on Inspection and 
f;valuation in Product Markets" (unpublished. manuscript, California Institute of 
Technology, February 1978). I would like to thank Steve Lippman and Alan Schwartz 
for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Comparative statics results are proved 
in an Appendix which is available from the author (California Institute of Technology, 
Social Science Working Paper no. 306, January 1980). 
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These definitions turn out to be very strong. So strong, in fact, that 
they lead to some difficulties. Consider, for example, experience 
goods. For these goods utility is assessed after purchase by actual 
consumption. But at least the price is observed before purchase. Since 
for experience goods this cannot, by definition, affect the choice of 
which brand to buy, Nelson was forced to assume that "consumers 
either sample at random from among all brands or from among those 
brands in the price range the consumer deems appropriate for him­
self" ( 1970, p. 313). These assumptions require that consumers either 
ignore prices completely or have perfect information regarding 
prices, neither of which seems likely. 
The problem with Nelson's definitions is that goods generally pos­
sess a number of characteristics which can differ in their degree of 
observability. Thus a good might possess some "search characteristics" 
and·some "experience characteristics." Furthermore, whether a par­
ticular characteristic is a search characteristic or an experience char­
acteristic ought to be endogenously determined by the consumer. 
In previous work, I have analyzed a model in which goods are 
described by precisely two characteristics, price and quality. The mar­
ket is described by an exogenous distribution of these characteristics. 
Sampling from this distribution is assumed to be costly. Once an 
observation is drawn, price is observed costlessly. Quality, however, 
can never be observed before purchase. In this case quality is an 
extreme example of an experience characteristic, one for which the 
cost of observation prior to purchase is infinite. The present paper 
extends this model to allow quality to be observed at some finite cost. 
The purpose is to explicate the relationships between information 
costs, duration of search, and turnover.1 
This model; introduced in Wilde (1980), applies to a number of 
cases discussed by Nelson. For example, it formalizes his prototypic 
experience good, canned tuna fish. Nelson suggested that "to evaluate 
brands of canned tuna fish, for example, the consumer would almost 
certainly purchase brands of tuna fish for consumption. He could, 
then, determine from several purchases which brand he preferred. 
For tuna fish there is no effective search alternative open. At the low 
price of experience, there is insufficient demand for specialized es­
tablishments selling tastes of various brands of tuna fish" ( 1970, p. 
312). In this case, Nelson seems to be suggesting that the "price of 
experience" is low because the price of the good is low. However, the 
1 The formal analysis in this paper will be set in the product market. In this case 
turnover is a nonrepeat sale. Sec. IV will discuss applications to the labor market and 
the marriage market. In the labor market, turnover is a quit and in the marriage market 
turnover is a divorce. 
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price of experience can be low for other reasons as well. For example, 
if there is little variance in quality, then the price of experience is low 
because there is little chance of purchasing a low-quality good. In fact, 
it will turn out that by allowing quality to be observed before purchase 
an explicit expression for the price of experience can be derived. 
Utilizing this expression, this paper will also explicate the relationship 
between information costs and the price of experience. 
The focus of the model developed in Section II is on an imperfectly 
informed consumer who is interested in maintaining a flow of con­
sumption of a good which is described by price and quality. The 
market offers various combinations of price and quality, but the 
consumer cannot costlessly observe them; by paying a search cost he 
or she can sample a good from the market, but only price is observed. 
Quality can be observed either before purchase by actual inspection 
(at some additional cost) or after purchase by actual consumption. 
Whether quality is observed before purchase (herein called inspec­
tion) or after purchase (herein called evaluation), the consumer can 
return to the market and resample if the observed quality is too low. 
The initial problem is to characterize the optimal strategy for a con­
sumer in such an environment. For a fixed utility function, joint 
distribution of price and quality, and cost of search, three possibilities 
arise depending on the cost of inspection: ( 1) If the cost of inspection 
is low enough, inspection will be the optimal strategy for low prices 
and drawing a new observation will be the optimal strategy for high 
prices. (2) If the cost of inspection is of an intermediate amount, 
evaluation will be the optimal strategy for low prices, inspection will 
be the optimal strategy for intermediate prices, and drawing a new 
observation will be the optimal strategy for high prices. (3) If the cost 
of inspection is high enough, evaluation will be the optimal strategy 
for low prices and drawing a new observation will be the optimal 
strategy for high prices. 
The formal results of the paper relate to the characterization of the 
consumer's optimal strategy which is summarized by statements 1-3 
above. However, these results have broad implications. Three im­
portant general observations emerge from the analysis. 
First, as mentioned above, the price of experience can be defined 
analytically. This is important because it allows one to differentiate 
between the direct, short-run benefits of purchasing a good which are 
derived from its consumption and the indirect, long-run benefits of 
purchasing a good which are derived from evaluation of its quality 
attributes. 
Second, it will be demonstrated that in some cases quality will be a 
pure search characteristic (statement 1 above), in some cases it will be 
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neither a pure search characteristic nor a pure experience character­
istic (statement 2 above), and in some cases it will be a pure experience 
characteristic (statement 3 above). Hence, not only is determining 
whether a particular good is an experience good or a search good a 
complex matter, but so is determining whether a particular charac­
teristic of that good is an experience characteristic or a search char­
acteristic. Since these distinctions have become very popular in the 
literature it is important to understand their limitations. 
Finally, the comparative statics associated with the characterization 
of the consumer's optimal strategy will show that the theoretical 
foundations of much of the empirical work on duration of search and 
turnover in labor markets and marriage markets are unsound. 
A number of specific empirical predictions are also derived. It is 
shown that quality is more likely to be a search attribute (I) the lower
is the cost of search, (2) the lower is the cost of inspection, (3) the 
higher is the price of the good, and (4) the larger is the variation in
utility due to quality relative to the variation in utility due to price. 
Similarly, it is shown that quality is more likely to be an experience 
attribute ( 1) the higher is the cost of search, (2) the higher is the cost 
of inspection, (3) the lower is the price of the good, and (4) the smaller
is the variation in utility due to quality relative to the variation in 
utility due to price. 
It is also shown that regardless of whether quality is a search 
attribute or an experience attribute, increases in search costs decrease 
the duration of search. In general, increases in inspection costs have 
ambiguous effects on the duration of search, but it is argued that if 
the variation in utility due to quality relative to the variation in utility 
due to price is low, increases in inspection costs are likely to increase 
the duration of search (at least by one measure). 
Finally, considerable attention is focused on turnover. Again, in the 
most general setting results tend to be ambiguous. This is especially 
true regarding the relationship between search costs and turnover. 
However, it is argued that if the variation in utility due to quality 
relative to the variation in utility due to price is low, increases in 
inspection costs are likely to increase turnover. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the basic 
model. Section III considers the three cases mentioned above: (a) in 
which quality is always observed before purchase; (b) in which quality
is observed before purchase for some prices but is observed after 
purchase for other prices; and (c) in which quality is always observed
after purchase. Section IV discusses the empirical implications of the 
model in the labor market and the marriage market. Section V pro­
vides a brief conclusion. 
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II. The Model: Notation, Definitions, and Assumptions 
In this section the basic model will be developed and an analytical 
expression for the price of experience derived. Section III provides 
comparative statics for the three cases mentioned in the introduction. 
Assume the good which is sought by the consumer has a lifetime of 
one period. Let U(p, q) be the total net value to the consumer of 
purchasing and consuming the good characterized by price p and 
quality q, where U is differentiable and bounded on R+ X R+ with 
aU!ap < 0 and auJaq > 0. Let </J (p, q) be the consumer's subjective 
estimate of the market density of P and Q. For mathematical conve­
nience, assume <P is strictly positive on R+ X R+· Definef(p) as the 
marginal density of P and g(q I p) as the conditional density of Q given
P = p, both based on </J. 
The cost of drawing an observation at random from <Pis cs, where
cs � 0. The cost of observing the true vqlue of Q prior to purchase is
Cn where Cr � 0 (both cs and cr are measured in the same units as U).
The consumer can sample as many observations as desired from <P 
at the beginning of each period. Any number of inspections are also 
allowed. However, the consumer demands precisely one unit of the 
good each period. 2 The consumer's objective is to maximize his or her 
expected discounted utility of consumption net of search costs. Sam­
pling is assumed to be without recall, the horizon is infinite, and the 
discount rate is {3, where 0 < f3 < 1. 
Now suppose the consumer has sampled a good priced at p. Three 
reactions are possible: sample again without observing quality; inspect 
quality and then either buy the good forever or sample again; or 
evaluate quality and then either buy the good forever or sample 
again. Let v (p) be the expected value of drawing an observation of p 
and then proceeding optimally. Then 
v (p) =-cs+ max {V,B(p), T(p)}, ( 1)
where V is the expected value of search (i.e., the expected value of 
v[p] taken with respect tof),B(p) is the expected value of buying the 
good without observing quality and then proceeding optimally, and 
T(p) is the expected value of testing quality prior to purchasing the 
good and then proceeding optimally. 
To defineB(p) and T(p) analytically, observe first that, once quality 
is known, the value of the optimal policy is the same whether quality is 
observed via inspection or evaluation. In other words, once quality 
has been observed, it is irrelevant how it was observed-any asso-
2 Search and inspection are assumed to be timeless in order to avoid confounding the 
direct costs of these activities with the opportunity cost of delaying the purchase 
decision. 
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ciated costs will by then be sunk costs. Define the value of the optimal 
policy once quality is known as k(p). Then 
k(p) = VG[q*(p) I pJ + {:p) �(1!: �) g(q I p)dq, (2) 
where q*(p) is that quality level which makes the consumer indifferent 
between consuming the good characterized by [p, q*(p)] and search­
ing again for a new good from cp. That is, q*(p) is defined by U[p,
q*(p)] = V(l - {3). The logic of (2) is that if q < q*(p), then the
consumer rejects the good and samples again, receiving V (the ex­
pected value of search). This happens with probability G [q*(p) Ip]. If
q;:,: q*(p), then the good is acceptable and the consumer receives the 
conditional expected value of U(p, q)l(I - /3), given q ;:,: q*(p). 
Using k(p), bothB (p) and T(p) are defined straightforwardly. If the 
consumer buys the good priced at p, he or she receives the expected 
utility of consumption, given quality is unknown, plus the discounted 
value of an optimal policy once quality is known. Hence 
B(p) = EU(p, Q) + f3k(p). (3)
If the consumer tests for quality prior to purchase, he or she pays cr 
and receives the undiscounted value of an optimal policy once quality 
is known. Hence 
(4) 
From (3), by adding and subtracting k(p) and rearranging,B(p) can 
be rewritten asB(p) =-[(I - f3)k(p) -EU(p, Q)] + k(p). The term in 
brackets is a cost which is directly comparable to Cr. That is, one can
define 
cn(P) = (I - f3)k(p) - EU(p, Q). (5) 
Then B(p) = -cn(P) + k(p).
Equation (5) provides an analytical expression for Nelson's price of
experience. Furthermore, it has a natural interpretation. Recall that 
k(p) is the expected value of an optimal policy once quality is known, 
given the observed price is p. When quality is observed via actual 
consumption, this value is not obtained for one period (since in this 
model the good lasts for precisely one period). Hence (I - f3)k(p) is 
the gross opportunity cost of consuming the good, given quality is 
unknown. But consumption of the good yields utility, in this case 
EU(p, Q). The net opportunity cost of consuming the good, given 
quality is unknown, is the difference between these two quantities. 
In analyzing the optimal policy it will be convenient to make a 
transformation of variables in the definition of k(p). Since it is ulti-
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mately final utility which matters to the consumer, the focus of (2) can 
be shifted from the conditional distribution of quality given price to 
the conditional distribution of utility given price. That is, let 'l'(w I p)
be the conditional distribution of utility given P = p. Then k(p)
becomes 
k(p) = VW[V(l - /3) Ip] +J z<
P> -1 
w 
/3 1/J (w IP)dw,V(l-/.1) -
where z(p) = limq___,00U(p, q). Integrating (6) by parts gives
I 
Z(P) 
]k(p) = ( 1  - /3)-1[z(p) - 'l'(w I p)dw . ' V(l-/.1) 
(6) 
(7) 
This form of k(p) is intuitively less appealing than (6), but it is more
powerful. For example, using (5) it is easy to show from (7) that
J
V(l-/.1)
cB(p) = _ 'l'(w IP)dw. Z(P) (8) 
where i(p) = U(p, 0). Expressing the price of experience in this form
is useful analytically since it makes the comparison between B (p) and 
T(p) easier. Conceptually, it helps identify factors which might affect 
the decision whether to observe quality before purchase or after 
purchase. For example, suppose the cost of search, cs, increases. Then
surely the value of an optimal policy will fall, that is, 8V!acs < 0.
Equation (8) suggests that the price of experience will then fall as well. 
Hence the higher is the cost of search, the more likely it is that 
evaluation will be optimal. These and other results will be formalized 
in the following section. First, however, a few more preliminary as­
sumptions will be needed. 
Using the definition of cB(p) introduced above in equation (5), the
functional equation ( 1) can be rewritten as 
v(p) =-cs+ max {V, k(p) - cB(p), k(p) - cr}.3 (9) 
The .next step in characterizing an optimal policy is to compare V, k(p) 
- cB(p), and k(p) - Cr. Unfortunately, without more structure on the
joint distribution of price and quality, any number of things can 
happen. Nelson recognized this problem as well, stating the following: 
"Prior to using [a] brand, all the consumer knows is its price. But this 
knowledge provides only the roughest sort of guide to choice, for the 
consumer must assume a generally positive relationship between price 
3 It is convenient at this point to assume that the functional equation (1) has a unique, 
bounded solution. In this case V is unique and well defined. Existence of a bounded 
solution to (1) is straightforward. Uniqueness can be established along traditional lines 
if search and inspection are not assumed to be timeless (see Wilde 1979) or by appealing 
to the appropriate generalization of MacQueen and Miller (1960). 
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and quality. In the absence of any other information, the consumer 
would not know if he were better off experimenting with low- or 
high-priced brands" (1970, p. 313). To get around this problem, 
Nelson converts the joint distribution of price and quality to a dis­
tribution of net utility and proceeds under the assumption that evalu­
ation is always used to observe quality. In the present analysis, since 
the decision whether to observe quality before purchase or after 
purchase is endogenous, a more formal approach is needed. The 
standard assumption is that 8'11(w I p)/ap > 0. This assumption im­
plies that, on average, higher price is associated with lower utility even 
though higher price may well be associated with higher quality. Be­
cause this assumption is discussed at length in Wilde (1980), it will be 
assumed to hold here without further rationalization. 4 
,Several implications follow directly from the assumption that 
a'l'(w Ip )lap > 0. First, it implies that the price of experience is
increasing in the price of the good. To see this, simply take the 
derivative of (8) with respect to p: 
J, VO-Ill 
c�<p) = _ [8'11(w Jp)lap]dw - 'l'[i(p) I p]i'(p) 
z(p) 
f VO-/l) 
= Jz<v> [8'11(w Jp)!ap]dw,
since 'l'[i(p)JpJ = 0 by definition. Second, 8'11(wJp)!ap > 0 implies
that observing quality before purchase becomes a less desirable alter­
native to sampling again as the observed price increases. That is, using 
(6), 
f, z<P>
T'(p) = k'(p) = - [8'11(w I p)!ap]dw <;;; 0.VO-/l) (10) 
Moreover, B'(p) = k'(p) - c�(p) <;;; T'(p) since c�(p) � 0. Hence
observing quality after purchase also becomes a less desirable alterna­
tive to sampling again as the observed price increases, and it does so at 
an even faster rate than observing quality before purchase. 
III. The Optimal Policy 
It turns out that three qualitatively distinct forms of the optimal policy 
are possible. If cr is low enough, then inspection always dominates
evaluation. If cr is somewhat higher, then evaluation dominates in-
4 Even in the case where cT is infinite, some formal structure must be placed on '11. See 
Wilde ( 1980) or Hey and McKenna (1981) for more details. 
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spection for one set of prices and inspection dominates evaluation for 
another set of prices; and, if er is high enough, then evaluation always
dominates inspection. These three cases are analyzed next. 
A. Inspection Only 
In comparing the expected value of observing quality before pur­
chase to the expected value of observing quality after purchase, the 
crucial parameters are er and cB(p), the respective costs of these two
activities. It is clear from (3) and (4) thatB(p) � T(p) ascr � cB(p). But
cB (p) is increasing in p so that cB (0) � er implies cB(p) � er for all p � 0. 
Hence the expected value of observing quality before purchase will. 
always be greater than the expected value of observing quality after 
purchase when cB(O) > er. This is obviously most likely to be the case
when cB(O) is large and er is small. Equation (8) suggests that cB(O) is
most likely to be large when V(l - /3) is significantly greater than i(O). 
But V(l - /3) = U[O, q*(O)] and i(O) = U(O, 0). Hence c8(0) is most 
likely to be large when q*(O) is high. In other words, inspection is 
likely to dominate evaluation for all prices when the cost of inspection 
is low or when few quality levels are acceptable even at low prices. The 
latter is the case, for example, when the cost of drawing observations 
from cp is low or the variation in utility due to quality is high relative to
the variation in utility due to price.5 
In the remainder of this subsection it will be assumed that cB(O) � 
er; that is, it will be assumed that
I
VO-ti) 
'l"(w I O)dw �er. 
zco> 
This implies that B (p) ,,,; T(p) for all p � 0, in which case B (p) can be
ignored completely; characterizing the optimal policy reduces to 
comparing T(p) and V. Two possibilities arise. In the first there exists 
a unique finite price, say p:, such that observing quality prior to 
purchase is optimal for p ,,,; P: and sampling again is optimal for p � 
P: (see fig. 1). The critical price is defined by V = T(#).6 In the
second, V is strictly less than T(p) for all p � 0 so that observing quality
prior to purchase is always optimal.7 
5 There is no guarantee that cB(p) > 0. In particular, it might be the case that c8(0) = 
0. It can be shown, however, that there exists E > 0 such that cB(O) > 0 if Cs < E. 
6 Since a'l'(w I p)!ap > 0 only implies T'(p) � 0, it is possible that the equation T(p) = 
V does not have a unique solution. However, if this is the case, then {p I T(p) = V} == 
[p*, oo) , where P* = inf {p I T(p) = V}. If P* is defined in this fashion, it satisfies the 
formal requirements stated in the text. 
7 Formal proofs of these assertions have been omitted since they are trivial. It is 
apparent, however, that since c8(0) ;;,, 0, there is always a small enough value of cr 
(possibly 0) such that B(p) � T(p) for all p ;;,, 0. 
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FIG. !.-Definition of p� 
Assume thatp� exists and,is finite. Thenp� andq* partitionR+ X R+ 
into three sets (see fig. 2). In region I, p > P:, so the good is rejected
outright. In region 11,p � P: but q < q*(p), so that quality is observed
prior to purchase but the good is subsequently rejected (i.e., not 
purchased). In region III, p � P: and q � q*(p), so that quality is
observed prior to purchase and the good is subsequently accepted 
(i.e., purchased). 
How do changes in cs and cr affect this partition? To answer this 
question one needs to know how changes in cs and cr affect P: and q*.
The following results are straightforward but tedious and can be 
found in the (unpublished) Appendix to this paper. It is shown there 
that dp:tdcs > 0 and dp:tdcr < 0. Of course V falls as either cs or cr 
rises. Since U[p, q*(p)] = V(l - {3) by definition and U is increasing in 
q, this implies dq*(p)ldcs < 0 and dq*(p)ldcr < 0. In other words, an 
increase in the cost of drawing observations from <P will make inspec­
tion an optimal strategy for more prices while an increase in the cost 
of inspection will make inspection an optimal strategy for less prices. 
An increase in either cost will make more quality levels acceptable for 
any given price. 
Next, consider how changes in cs and cr affect the number of 
observations which must be drawn from <P (whether or not quality is 
inspected) before an acceptable good is found. Define 
0 p* T 
FIG. 2.-Price-quality combinations, case A: I = reject outright, II = inspect and 
subsequently reject, III = inspect and subsequently accept. 
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I.PT ls= 0 {l - G[q*(p) I p]}j(p)dp 
and 
IF= IoPT G[q*(p) I p]j(p)dp.
Here IF is the probability that a random price-quality combination will 
be inspected and rejected, and ls is the probability that a random 
price-quality combination will be inspected and accepted. It is ag-ain 
shown in the Appendix that the following hold: 8lsf 8cs > 0 and 
8JF/8cs � 0, while 8lsf8cr � 0 and 8/F/acr < 0. 
Consider first an increase in the cost of drawing observations. Since 
P: increases, inspection becomes an optimal strategy for more prices.
Furthermore, since q*(p) decreases, more quality levels are acceptable 
for any given price. Hence the expected number of observations 
which must be drawn from cf> before an acceptable good is found 
(Ills) falls. The effect of an increase in cs on IF is ambiguous, how­
ever, because the decrease in q*(p) counteracts the increase in P: 
rather than reinforcing it. 
Precisely the opposite happens when the cost of inspection in­
creases. Since P: falls, inspection becomes an optimal strategy for less
prices. Furthermore, since q*(p) still decreases, fewer quality levels are 
acceptable for any given price. Hence IF falls. Since the effect on Is is 
ambiguous, it is impossible to assert that an increase in the cost of 
inspection reduces the expected number of observations which must 
be drawn from cf> before an acceptable good is found. 
B. Inspection and Evaluation 
It was assumed throughout Section IIIA that c n(O) �Cr so that inspec­
tion dominated evaluation for all prices. Recall that 
J 
VO-/l) 
cn(O) = 'l'(w I O)dw. 
z<O> 
It is apparent from this equation that 8cn(0)/8cs < 0 and 8cn(0)/8cr <
0 since V is decreasing in either cost and 'l'(w I 0) > 0 for w close to
i(O). Hence increases in either cs or cr make it less likely that inspec­
tion will dominate evaluation for all prices. 
Assume that cn(O) < cr. Then two possibilities arise. In the first, 
inspection is optimal for one set of prices and evaluation is optimal for 
another set of prices. In the second, inspection is never optimal. The 
first possibility will be analyzed now and the second will be considered 
in Section IIIC.8 
8 Again, formal proofs that ranges of cs and cr exist such that both possibilities occur 
have been omitted. The text following identifies two necessary conditions for inspection 
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0 p* T 
B(pl 
FIG. 3.-Definition of pZT and p� 
In order for inspection to be optimal for one set of prices and 
evaluation to be optimal for another set of prices two conditions must 
be met. Assuming cB(O) < er, the first can be stated as follows.
CONDITION 1: The cost of inspection must not be so great that 
evaluation dominates inspection for all prices. 
When condition 1 holds, since B '(p) � T' (p) � 0, there exists a finite 
price Pir such that evaluation dominates inspection for p � Pir and
inspection dominates evaluation for p � Pir· The critical price is
defined by T(fh) = B(Pir) (see fig. 3). 
. 
Assuming condition 1 holds, the second condition can be stated as 
follows. 
CONDITION 2: The expected return to search must be low 
enough that for some prices inspection dominates drawing 
another observation from cf>. 
Condition 2 requires that for some p > Pir, T(p) > V. However, as in 
case A, it might be that T(p) > V for all p � P�r· Assume this does not
hold. Then there exists a finite price p� such that inspection is optimal 
for p E [p ir, p�], and drawing another observation from cf> is optimal
for p � p�. Again, as in Section IIIA, the critical price is defined by
T(p�) = V (see fig. 3).9 
Overall, the situation dealt with in this case is the most interesting of 
the model because it shows that quality can be a search characteristic 
for some prices and an experience characteristic for other prices. 
That is, the configuration of utility, search costs, inspection costs, and 
the joint distribution of price and quality are such that inspection, 
evaluation, and drawing another observation from cf> are all optimal 
strategies for various prices. In general, p�, Pir, and q* partition R+ X 
R+ into five regions (see fig. 4). As in case A, region I includes prices 
to be optimal for one set of prices and evaluation to be optimal for another set of prices. 
There seems to be little value in making these more formal. 
9 Again, since o'l'(w I P)lop > 0 only implies B'(p) .;; 0, the solution to the equation 
T(p) = B(p) may not be unique. In this case {p I T(p) = B(p)} = [piT, oo) where piT = inf 
{p I T(p) = B(p)}. If piT is defined in this fashion, it satisfies the formal requirements 
stated in the text. 
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FIG. 4.-Price-quality combinations, case B: I = reject outright, II = inspect and 
ultimately reject, III = inspect and ultimately accept, IV = purchase once and only 
once, V = purchase once and forevermore. 
for which rejecting the good outright is optimal. In region II, p;r < p 
�pf but q < q*(p), so that quality is observed prior to purchase but
the good is subsequently rejected; and in region III, p;r < p � P"f, but
q;;,: q*(p), so that quality is observed prior to purchase and the good is 
subsequently accepted. There are two additional regions, though. In 
region IV, p � p;r and q < q*(p), so that the good is purchased 
without quality having been observed but is not repurchased. In 
region V, p � p;r and q;;,: q*(p), so that the good is purchased without 
quality having been observed and is repurchased in all subsequent 
periods. 
How do changes in cs and cr affect this partition? As before, to 
answer this question we need to know how changes in cs and cr affect 
Pir, pf, and q*(p). As in case A, dpfldcs > 0 and dpfldcr < 0. Also,
dp;rldcs > 0 and dp;rldcr > 0. Finally, dq*(p)ldcs < 0 and dq*(p)ldcr 
< 0. 
An increase in the cost of drawing observations will increase the set 
of prices for which evaluation is an optimal strategy. Furthermore, it 
will increase the set of prices for which either inspection or evaluation 
is an optimal strategy. An increase in the cost of inspection will 
increase the set of prices for which evaluation is an optimal strategy, 
will decrease the set of prices for which inspection is an optimal 
strategy, and will decrease the set of prices for which either inspection 
or evaluation is an optimal strategy. Finally, an increase in either cs or 
cr will make more quality levels acceptable at any given price. 
It is again useful to consider how increases in cs and cr affect the 
probability that a random price-quantity combination will fall in any 
given region. Define 
f.PBr
Es= 0 {l - G[q*(p) IP]}f(p) dp, 
f.PBr
EF = 0 G[q*(p) IPlf(p)dp, 
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ls= J:f·{l - G[q*(p) IP]}f(p)dp,PJJr 
and 
IF = L;: G[q*(p) IPJJ(p)dp.
Here IF, ls, EF, and Es are the probabilities a random price-quality 
combination will fall in region II, III, IV, or V, respectively. It can be 
shown that 
Furthermore, 
Finally, 
8(ls +Es) > 0 andacs 
and 8EF � 08cr < . 
8(ls +Es)� O a < . Cr 
While the majority of these partial derivatives are ambiguous in 
sign, a number of interesting observations can still be made. First, the 
probability that a random price-quality combination will be acceptable 
(whether quality is inspected or evaluated) is given by ls+ Es. Hence
the expected number of observations needed to locate an acceptable 
good is Il(I s + Es). As before, this quantity is decreasing in cs and 
ambiguous in Cr. Second, both 8Esl8cs > 0 and 8Esl8cr > 0. That is,
the probability that a random price-quality combination will be pur­
chased without quality having been observed and subsequently repur­
chased is increasing in either cost. This is because when either cs or Cr 
increases, the set of prices for which evaluation is optimal increases 
and the set of quality levels which are acceptable for any given price 
also increases. However, this necessarily implies aE F/acs and aE F/acr 
are ambiguous in sign. This last observation is important. When a 
price-quality combination falls in region IV, the good is purchased 
without quality having been observed but is not subsequently repur­
chased. This "brand disloyalty" is analogous to a job quit in the labor 
market or a divorce in the marriage market. It is crucial to recognize 
that the likelihood of these events does not appear to be systematically 
related to either search costs or inspection costs. This point will be 
discussed in more detail in Section IV. 
IV:E, 
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FIG. 5.-Definition of p: 
p* • 
FIG. 6.-Price-quality combinations, case C: I = reject outright, IV = purchase once 
and only once, V = purchase once and forevermore. 
C. Evaluation Only 
The final case is one in which cn(O) < cr, but one of the conditions of 
case B does not hold.10 Under these circumstances evaluation will 
always dominate inspection for any acceptable price.11 Both this case 
and case A are, in a sense, special cases of case B. Here the relevant 
critical price, p;, is defined by B (pit) = V (see fig. 5). The elements of
the associated partition correspond to regions I, IV, and V of case B 
(see fig. 6). Of course cr has no effect on this partition. The effects of
c8 are identical to those in case B (where p; now replaces Pitr) . 
IV. Applications 
The model analyzed in this paper has obvious analogues in the labor 
market and the marriage market. The product market has been used 
as the setting to this point because much of the relevant literature 
deals with consumer behavior (e.g., Nelson 1970; Lippman and 
•0 This will certainly be the case when cT is large enough, since U is bounded. 
11 That is, B(p) "" T(p) for any p such that V < max {B(p), T(p)}. 
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McCall 1979a; Wilde 1980; and Hey and McKenna 1981). However, 
many of the important qualitative implications of the model emerge 
more sharply in the labor market than in the product market. 
The labor market analogue concerns an unemployed worker 
searching for a job. This individual pays a search cost in order to 
sample vacancies, but only the wage rate is observed. Nonwage char­
acteristics can be observed either by paying an inspection cost or by 
taking the job. 
Two aspects of the labor market analogue are of primary inter­
est-unemployment and the quit rate. Unemployment is related to 
the expected duration of search. The quit rate is related to the 
probability that a job which is accepted will subsequently be rejected. 
Suppose that the distributions of net utility associated with jobs, 
conditional on the wage rate, are stochastically decreasing in the wage 
rate. Then, in the most interesting case, there will be a range of low 
wages for which renewing search is optimal, a range of intermediate 
wages for which inspection is optimal, and a range of high wages for 
which evaluation is optimal (see Sec. IIIB above). 
The effects of an increase in information costs on the duration of 
search seem straightforward. An increase in the cost of search makes 
both inspection and evaluation more desirable alternatives. Hence the 
duration of search should fall. An increase in the cost of inspection 
will likely have ambiguous effects on the duration of search because it 
makes evaluation a more desirable alternative, but it also makes in­
spection a less desirable alternative. 
The effects of an increase in information costs on the quit rate are 
less obvious. The argument would seem to go as follows: A quit 
requires that two events occur: (1) a wage rate is observed for which it 
is optimal to take the job without observing its nonwage component 
first and (2) the nonwage component turns out to be too low so that it 
is optimal to quit and renew search once it is observed. But an increase 
in either search costs or inspection costs makes evaluation optimal for 
more wages. In particular, there are lower wages for which evaluation 
is now optimal. These jobs must have higher nonwage components in 
order to be acceptable; that is, for them the probability of turnover is 
higher. Hence, the overall probability of a quit should increase as 
either cost increases. 
Unfortunately, these heuristics are incomplete because neither con­
siders the fact that an increase in either c8 or Cr will decrease the 
return to search, making lower values of the nonwage component 
acceptable at any given wage. While this reinforces the argument 
regarding the relationship between information costs and the dura­
tion of search, it weakens the argument regarding the relationship 
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between information costs and the quit rate. In fact, an increase in 
either cost could either increase or decrease the quit rate.12 
To justify these assertions formally the model of Section III must be 
used. Consider first the duration of search. There are really two 
measures which are of interest. First, Es + ls gives the probability that 
a random price-quality observation will ultimately be acceptable (re­
gardless of how quality is observed). Second, EF + Es+ ls gives the 
probability that a random price observation will cause search to cease 
(although perhaps only temporarily). It was stated in Section III that 
a(Es +ls)> O and a(Es +ls)> Oacs 8cr < • 
It can also be shown that 
8(EF +Es+ ls) > O andacs 
8(EF +Es +ls) > Oa < . Cr 
Purchases of goods for which quality has not been observed are really 
part of the search process. Hence l/(Es +ls), which might be called 
the "pure duration of search," is the proper expression for the ex­
pected duration of search. However, empirically it would often be 
impossible to differentiate between observations which fall in region 
IV and observations which fall in region V. In other words, the 
observed duration of search would often correspond to l/(E F +Es + 
ls), which might be called the "effective duration of search." 
Similar problems arise with respect to turnover. In fact, there are 
three measures of turnover embedded in this model, one ex ante and 
two ex post. The ex ante measure is simply E F; it gives the probability 
that a random price-quality observation will be purchased once and 
only once. One ex post measure is what might be called the "pure 
failure rate for evaluation," EF = Ep/(EF + Es); it gives the conditional
probability that a good will be rejected given that it is purchased 
without quality having been observed. However, empirically it would 
often be hard to differentiate between observations which fall in 
region III and observations which fall in region V. Hence the other ex 
post measur� is what might be called the "effective failure rate for 
evaluation," EF = Ep/(EF +Es+ ls); it gives the conditional probabil­
ity that a good will be rejected given that it is purchased (regardless of 
whether quality is observed before purchase or after purchase). It 
turns out that none of these measures is systematically related to 
either search costs or inspection costs. 
12 See Lippman and McCall (1979b) for an extensive discussion of these points in a 
related model. 
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The third application of this theoretical framework is to the mar­
riage market. The marriage market analogue concerns an unwed 
individual searching for a marriage partner. This individual pays a 
search cost in order to sample potential partners, but only some 
characteristics are observed. Other characteristics can be observed 
either by paying an inspection cost or by getting married. 
The aspect of the marriage market analogue which is of primary 
interest is dissolution. The most complete analysis of the relationship 
between information costs and probability of dissolution is provided 
by Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977). These authors consider two 
cases, one in which remarriage is impossible and one in which the 
remarriage market is identical to the marriage market. 
· 
Consider first the case in which remarriage is impossible. When 
remarriage is impossible, the value of dissolution is a constant. In the 
model analyzed in this paper an analogous assumption is that the 
value of not repurchasing a good is a constant, say V. Then instead of
(3), B (p) would be defined as 
B(p) = E[U(p, Q) + {3k(p), (3') 
where 
k(p) = VG[q*(p) IPJ + �"' �(� z> g(q IP)dq,1t1•(p) 
and ij*(p) is defined by U[p, ij*(p)] = V(I - {3). The definition ofT(p)
would remain as in (4). This modification affects the comparative
statics of the model in a straightforward way; for p .;;; p �r. dij*(p) Ides = 
0 = dij*(p) ldcr. Hence as before, 8E8/8c8> 0 and 8E8/8cr> 0, but now
8EF/ac8 > 0 and 8EF!acr > 0. Furthermore, as before, 8E8/ac8 < 0 
and 8EF/8cr > 0, but now 8E8/acr < 0 and 8EF/8cr > 0. However, it
remains true, �ven when the value of not repurchasing a good is 
constant, that Es and EF bear no systematic relationship to informa­
tion costs. 
These results are, on the surface, consistent with those of Becker, 
Landes, and Michael. These authors assert that because "the proba­
bility of entering into a mismatch" would be greater, "an increase in 
either the cost of intensive or extensive search would increase the 
probability of dissolution" ( 1977, p. 1150).13 The definition of "prob­
ability of dissolution" which these authors use to arrive at this 
theoretical conclusion is apparently E F· The problem is that E F is
" 
unobservable (it isE F which is observed), and even w,hen remarriage is
13 Intensive search corresponds to inspection and extensive search corresponds to 
drawing another observation from cf>. Hence the cost of intensive search is Cr and the 
cost of extensive search is cs. 
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impossible, there is no systematic relationship between EF and either 
Cs or Cr! 
The situation is even more difficult when the remarriage market is 
identical to the marriage market. Here, just as in the labor market 
analogue, none of the partial derivatives relating information costs to 
turnover can be signed. 
These are, of course, somewhat negative observations. In addition, 
some positive conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. It has been 
shown that an increase in search costs always decreases the duration 
of search. An increase in inspection costs will generally increase the 
duration of search if the effect on q*(p) is small relative to the effect 
on Pir or p�. This will be the case when the variation in utility due to
quality is small relative to the variation in utility due to price. 
There appear to be no general conclusions to be drawn regarding 
the relationship between search costs and turnover. However, as 
above, an increase in inspection costs will generally increase turnover 
if the effect on q*(p) is small relative to the effect on Pir or p�. This is
again the case when the variation in utility due to quality is small 
relative to the variation in utility due to price. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has established a number of strong results which go 
against the grain of the extant literature. These results obtain because 
goods are viewed as multicharacteristic composites in which indi­
vidual characteristics have specific informational properties. 
A number of extensions are possible. An obvious one is to consider 
goods which are described by more than one nonprice attribute. In 
this case the consumer would need to decide which attributes to 
observe before purchase and which to observe after purchase. At each 
stage, reservation levels would be defined as functions of the actual 
levels of those attributes already observed. Finally, the consumer 
would also need to decide in which order to observe attributes. A 
model of this nature would have important applications in psychology 
and consumer research, as well as economics. However, one might 
argue that actual consumers do not use optimizing strategies as com­
plicated as this model would require. Rather, consumers would use 
various satisficing strategies. In fact, one might apply the same argu­
ment to the model analyzed in this paper. 
There is much to be said for this argument, but satisficing strategies 
are even less well understood than optimizing strategies. Further­
more, most empirical work on the duration of search and turnover is 
based, implicitly or explicitly, on simpler versions of the optimizing 
model developed in this paper (e.g., Becker, Landes, and Michael 
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1977). In any event, the issue offers a number of intriguing topics for 
future research. 
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